Ukrainian campaign group Razom We Stand today publishes new research revealing how political parties, senior politicians, and influence networks across Europe have helped protect Russia’s fossil-fuel revenues and continue to slow the phase-out of Russian gas even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The report, “Uncovering Drivers of Political Resistance to the Phase-Out of Russian Fossil Fuels in Europe”, maps how far-right and pro-Russian political actors, fossil-fuel lobbyists, and a web of think-tanks and public institutions have shaped narratives that weaken sanctions, obstruct REPowerEU, and maintain Europe’s long-standing dependence on Kremlin-linked energy.
Iryna Ptashnyk, Research and Policy Advisor at Razom We Stand, said: “What this research exposes is not simply political complacency — it is the quiet, structural support that allows Russia to keep waging a brutal war against Ukraine. For years, powerful political actors across Europe helped embed Russian fossil-fuel interests deep inside their own institutions. That influence did not vanish after the full-scale invasion. It continued to evolve, finding new channels through think-tanks, public bodies, lobby groups, and policy debates that shape Europe’s energy future.
Every time a politician repeats Kremlin-crafted narratives about ‘cheap gas’, every time a government delays action on Russian LNG, every time a loophole stays open—Russia gains time, money, and leverage. And Ukraine pays the price. These networks are not abstract: they enable a war machine that is killing innocent people every day. Ending Europe’s political and economic dependence on Russian fossil fuels is not just a climate imperative or a security imperative; it is a matter of saving Ukrainian lives.”
Key Findings:
Far-right and pro-Russian parties across Europe maintained ties to Kremlin energy interests
The report identifies FPÖ (Austria), Rassemblement National (France), AfD (Germany), and Lega (Italy) as political actors that have historically engaged with Russian state entities or fossil-fuel companies, and still promote narratives that defend gas dependence and attack renewable energy.
Their messaging mirrors Gazprom and Novatek’s talking points, including:
– Gas as a “clean” bridge fuel
– Opposition to accelerated deployment of renewables
– Claims that a full exit from Russian gas is “unrealistic”
Russia’s lobbying and influence structures remain active in Brussels
Through subsidiaries, joint ventures, consultancies, and long-standing corporate links, Gazprom and allied entities maintain a presence inside EU policymaking spaces. These networks seek to dilute sanctions, delay LNG restrictions, and reshape public debate around “energy security.”
Five case studies show how political vulnerability creates energy vulnerability
- Austria — extreme dependence tied to FPÖ-led political pressure; OMV and Gazprom legacy influence.
- Cyprus — geopolitical leverage and a track record of enabling Russian energy offshore structures.
- Romania — hybrid influence operations affecting Black Sea gas projects and political narratives.
Malta — a key hub in the shipping and flag-of-convenience system that enables Russian LNG and oil. As of 2024, Malta operates the sixth-largest ship registry in the world, with over 10,000 vessels flying its flag and a combined tonnage of roughly 100 million gross tonnes - Turkey — a complex energy partnership used by Moscow to maintain influence over regional gas flows. Today, Russia remains Turkey’s largest gas supplier, but its share has declined from over 60% two decades ago to 37% as of the first half of 2025.
Influence networks did not end after 2022, they adapted
The research shows that pro-Russian energy influence shifted deeper into think-tanks, public institutions, and political discourse across Europe, where it continues to shape resistance to sanctions and stall the implementation of REPowerEU.
The research comes as the EU enters the decisive stage of negotiations on the Russian Gas Ban Regulation. The findings reveal who, inside Europe, is shaping resistance to the phase-out, and why Russia has been able to preserve key components of its fossil-fuel export system, even during wartime.
